Washington’s Embrace of Delhi: In the World System of Power Game, Thorns for Yunus, Green Light for Hasina

Professor Dr Shyamal Das

1. Introduction

It was a diplomatic embrace that spoke louder than any official statement. When Washington fell in love with Delhi, the political temperature of the entire subcontinent changed overnight. The much-praised new India–United States agreement hailed in the name of “stability” in the Indo-Pacific has, in fact, quietly redrawn the power map of South Asia, and not in favour of Bangladesh’s interim ruler, Dr Muhammad Yunus.

For months, Yunus assumed that Washington’s corridors echoed with sympathy for his government. But that embrace from America was not merely symbolic; it was a signal of restructuring, a reminder that neoliberal power has no permanent friends, only permanent interests.

As Yunus burned in the fire of strategic neglect, Sheikh Hasina, long criticized by Western “moral guardians,” suddenly returned to the center of global conversation: steady, confident, and seemingly rehabilitated in the court of justice. Washington’s warmth toward Delhi appears to have cast a cold shadow over Yunus’s shaky throne while lighting a new lamp along Hasina’s path to political return.

The 2025 India–U.S. security and trade agreement has created a new reality in South Asian geopolitics. Although the United States had long shown tolerance toward Bangladesh’s interim government in the name of a so-called “democratic transition,” recent developments, particularly Sheikh Hasina’s reappearance in international media, suggest that Washington’s gaze is now fixed not on Dhaka, but on Delhi.

Taken together, the 10-year India–U.S. security pact, tariff reductions, and the use of only soft diplomatic language toward Pakistan make it clear that the United States now prefers to view South Asian stability through an India-led balance. In this reality, Bangladesh’s current interim government (under Dr Yunus) faces a crisis of legitimacy on the one hand and regional isolation on the other.

2. The complex workings of economics and its transnational political effects.

2.1: Geopolitical reality: India’s recent rise and America’s realignment

• • U.S.–India 10-year security agreement (2025): Includes decisions to expand military equipment cooperation, cyber defence, and regional surveillance.
  • U.S.–India trade and tariff reductions: The United States has called India a “trusted partner in critical supply chains” (U.S. DoC, 2025).
  • India-mediated stability model: In South Asia, the United States is now building an India-centric balance, that is, crafting a strategy around a stable regional power rather than around unstable or interim states such as Pakistan and Bangladesh.

We will try to unpack the logic behind the above through data. If diplomacy tells a story, data draws its map. Figure 1 shows that since 2015, U.S. trade with India has increased by roughly 90 per cent, while trade with Bangladesh has actually declined. Figure 2 illustrates a notable shift in the curve of the U.S. Strategic Engagement Index with India has increased from 58 to 87, while Bangladesh’s has declined below 40. And Figure 3 reveals the twist in the tale where Dr Yunus, once a media star buoyed by Western sympathy, has now nearly disappeared from the headlines, while Sheikh Hasina has reappeared prominently in Reuters, Deutsche Welle, and The Independent. In short: trade embraced Delhi, strategy saluted it, and the global narrative quietly pivoted away from Dhaka’s recent past.

Now, let us come to the main part of today’s article. We observed that, alongside the India–U.S. agreement, another development occurred simultaneously in the Bangladesh–India context. After the coup that took place in Bangladesh in July and August, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, while in India gave interviews to three highly influential international outlets (Reuters, Deutsche Welle, and The Independent). This also amounts to a kind of conferral of legitimacy by the international media upon her political position.
Now, let us explain why the India–U.S. dynamic means a “sideline” for Yunus but a “window of opportunity” for Hasina. For the reader’s convenience, we provide some theoretical and conceptual explanations for these reasons first; subsequently, they will be applied to the Bangladesh–India “sideline versus opportunity” interpretation.

2.1.a. Realism: the “anchor state” and reliability
In the Indo-Pacific balance, the U.S. objective is to contain/counter China. In this design, India is the anchor state. Therefore, Delhi’s preferences set Washington’s operating norms in the region. Who is reliable, stable, and delivery-capable in Bangladesh’s domestic politics, thus suddenly becomes very important.
Figure 1 (Trade) and Figure 2 (Strategic Engagement) show that interlock or mutual “bonds of cooperation” with India have risen rapidly; in other words, India-backed choices and lower transaction costs and risks from Washington’s perspective have influenced the relationship between the two countries.
Let us clarify further. What do the data and documents say that support the statement “U.S.–India interlock has increased because, in Washington’s view, transaction costs/risks have fallen”?

2.1.b. Trade interlock has increased rapidly (hard numbers)
“Trade interlock” refers to an economic and diplomatic linkage in which trade, investment, and supply chains between two countries are so intrinsically interdependent that a policy change or market shock in one has a direct impact on the other.
It is essentially an economic lock-in effect, meaning that breaking the relationship harms both parties. Trade interlock is really a combination of several propositions. It can be understood by the following equation:

Trade Interlock = Mutual Dependence + Policy Continuity + Low Transaction Risk.

An example: In 2024, total U.S.–India trade in goods and services was about $212.3 billion, which is +8.3% higher than in 2023. This is direct evidence that the bilateral economic “interlock” is tightening rapidly. (United States Trade Representative)
Monthly merchandise-trade continuity (2024) shows volumes that are high and stable, reducing operational uncertainty. (Census.gov)

2.1.c. Tariffs and dispute settlement are reducing “transaction friction”

In 2023, the two countries resolved six WTO disputes together; India removed retaliatory tariffs (on numerous items, including almonds, apples, chickpeas/lentils). Lower tariff friction reduces business transaction costs and policy risk. (United States Trade Representative + internationaltradeinsights.com)

Foundational defence agreements LEMOA/COMCASA/BECA raise interoperability and reduce cost/risk

• • According to U.S. State Department notes, LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA together have increased logistics provisioning, secure communications, and geospatial data-sharing, thereby boosting interoperability. (State Department)
  • An analytical document shows that LEMOA reduces operational costs for Indian forces, and under BECA/COMCASA, the U.S. shares vast data at “virtually no cost,” which brings down coordination transaction costs. (CNA)

2.1.d. Supply-chain “rules of the road”
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) Supply Chain Agreement took effect on February 24, 2024. Under this agreement, the U.S., India, and other partners undertake obligations regarding supply-chain monitoring, crisis response, and transparency standards. Joint rules/standards mean easier contract enforcement and lower policy-volatility risk. (mti.gov.sg + State Department)

2.1. e. Critical-tech interlock: iCET + semiconductor investment
Under the iCET framework, links in critical/emerging technologies, space cooperation, and the defence industry have deepened. Investment announcements by Micron and Applied Materials in India have provided the “hardware” for supply-chain diversification, reducing country risk and concentration risk. (The American Presidency Project + The White House)

In short, we learn that:

• • As trade volumes rise, tariff disputes fall, logistics/data-sharing expand, and supply-chain rules are strengthened, together these four pillars have tightened the interlock.
  • When logistics/comms/geo-data are interoperable and chains are standardized, transaction costs fall in contract execution, coordination, and information asymmetry; the risks of disputes/policy changes also decline. The cost-reduction logic of LEMOA/COMCASA/BECA is directly documented; IPEF’s rules-of-origin-type governance also reduces ex-ante risk. (CNA + State Department)

Now, let us see how the above complex issues relate to the Hasina versus Yunus discussion.

• • When Washington’s operating logic is “low friction, low risk, high delivery,” predictable partnerships along Delhi-aligned standards/corridors get priority. Under the Awami League, sustained coordination across ports/logistics/security can easily be perceived as India-backed, lower-risk preferences. By contrast, in an interim/ad-hoc regime, reduced institutional continuity raises transaction costs/risks, supporting our thesis. (See documentation under points 1–5 above.) (State Department)
    If you wish, I can insert these into your report as an “Evidence Box,” with citation tags beside each point (e.g., USTR State/White House/US Census/CNA).
  • Under Awami League rule, there are markers of long-term infrastructure/security coordination; under the Yunus regime, administrative fragility and uncertainty of survival raise the “unreliable partner” risk in the regional game. Result: Hasina = reliable; Yunus = high risk.

2.2. The “Two-Level Game” (Putnam): the link between external signals and internal legitimacy
External (Level I) strategic signals reshape internal (Level II) politics. The Washington Delhi “hug” is just such a signal:

• • Externally: Priority to India; in Bangladesh, a “lower risk” actor is needed.
  • Internally: A shift in media/diplomatic tone makes a Hasina return narrative possible (Chart 3: Media Attention). This signal indicates “with whom Washington finds it easier to achieve its goals,” pricing Hasina up and Yunus down in the domestic legitimacy market. Let us discuss this a bit more in the light of game theory.

3. Neoliberal institutionalism: why stability is big capital

“Neoliberal institutionalism” means that in today’s world, a state builds trust not merely through power or friendship, but through policy continuity, administrative stability, and technological capacity. By this theory, the more predictable a state is, the more preferred it becomes as a partner for investment, diplomacy, and security cooperation.

Example 1: Potholes and corridor politics
Imagine a portion of the India-to-U.S. cargo or supply chains runs through Bangladesh. To keep that corridor open, you need continuous policy, steady administrative competence, and infrastructural predictability. If the government changes midway and the new government says, “no more cargo on this route,” investors get spooked, logistics are disrupted, and business shifts elsewhere. Such uncertainty appears to foreign partners as risk (policy inconsistency). Under Hasina, long-term policy continuity built this confidence; the interim character of the Yunus government creates fears of unexpected change for foreign partners.

Example 2: Data and cyber standards
Frameworks like IPEF or the QUAD today are not only about military or trade, they also work on data security, cyber rules, and digital trade standards. For instance, if Google or Tesla wishes to set up servers or a factory in Bangladesh, they want assurance that laws won’t change abruptly, censorship or tax policy won’t be erratic, and courts will secure their contracts. Under Hasina, such policy stability was comparatively stronger; the Yunus government’s limited experience and uncertainty make foreign companies hesitate.

The upshot is that precisely because of neoliberal policy logics, the India–U.S. agreement and international frameworks like the IPEF prioritize governments that are stable, administratively competent, and predictable in their policies. In that setting, the Hasina government is the “stable hand,” whereas the Yunus government is a “transition risk.” This reality now makes Hasina’s return to South Asia’s diplomatic map both reasonable and likely.

4. The World System of Power: “delivery versus disruption”

Beyond the complex economic account above, the most important political explanation lies in game theory. Let us explain why, even if the Yunus government “shows obedience,” the four major powers will ultimately refuse it and tilt toward Hasina. Remember, this is not merely a normative question; it is the practical politics of the World System of Power, where the bargaining of great powers and the functioning of regional corridors are decisive. Let us take the issues one by one.

4.1. The Consideration In the world system of power: “The system does not need a ‘good boy,’ but ‘capable hands that deliver.”

4.1.a The four major actors, the United States, India, China, and Russia, are not in total conflict today; in South Asia, there is a notable trend of hedging and compromise. The goals are:

• • Supply-chain and corridor security (ports, roads, rail, data/cyber)
  • Risk predictability (policy continuity, honouring contracts, administrative capacity)

4.1.b In this global/regional set-up, the key is not who is more compliant, but whose delivery is more durable and stable. In this light, we must see how the differences between the two main players in our discussion affect the current context.

• • Yunus: opportunistic, ideationally hollow, and capacity-deficient → corridor/contract risk rises. Even if Yunus grants corridors and other concessions at will in Bangladesh today, there has been widespread questioning at home and abroad regarding competence and legal legitimacy in these undertakings.
  • Hasina: predictable, with a durable delivery track record and far more effective at ensuring legal legitimacy; even if contracts have limits under her, they are more sustainable and legitimate, thereby reducing contract risk.

4.2 Not pro-U.S., but pro-stability: the structure of Hasina’s acceptability
Sheik Hasina has indeed in the past said “no” directly to the United States on ports/islands/corridors. Even so, the world system today buys pro-stability signals at a higher price, not “pro-U.S.” ones. The reason is that the great powers’ aim is not direct access, but to keep long-term, lower-risk corridors running through multilateral or India-mediated frameworks. In this format, Dhaka can preserve its sovereignty while ensuring compliance with standards, customs, and cyber interoperability, which is more predictable under Hasina’s administration.

Dr. Yunus can offer “access” on paper, but the lack of legitimacy and continuity in his government is not sustainable in the eyes of foreign partners. A deal struck today could be halted tomorrow in the courts, on the streets, or in politics because of this high risk; the “high access, low durability” profile falls to the bottom of the list of acceptability. By contrast, Hasina offers “moderate access, high durability” where the same outcomes can be achieved with less controversy and greater staying power under multilateral umbrellas, such as those involving India/Japan/ADB, without increasing direct U.S. presence.

Therefore, the currency of acceptability is not durability. By this logic, among the four major powers’ common denominators, Hasina is the “stable hand,” and Yunus is the “volatile asset.” The matrix below indicates that reality.

Access vs Durability Matrix   Bangladesh Scenarios
Source: Author’s analytical schema (illustrative).

5. In the language of game theory, the payoffs have changed

In the ongoing game within the world system of power centered on the Indian subcontinent and its region, we will discuss in some detail why Sheikh Hasina, in the eyes of the major international and regional actors (the U.S., India, China, Russia), ranks ahead of / is more acceptable than the local/regional alliances (BNP/Tarique, NCP, the Jamaat- and Pakistan-linked blocs).

5. a. In simple terms, why both big and small actors will prefer Hasina (or dislike her less)

5.a.1. Stability and continuity

• • The great powers (U.S./India/China/Russia) want large projects, corridors, investment realization, and security coordination to endure in the long term. Hasina is administratively predictable; her policy continuity is recognized. The Yunus coalition, especially where BNP/Jamaat/Pakistan links exist, can exacerbate domestic instability and legal challenges, thereby increasing the risk for the great powers.

5.a.2. Legitimacy and public support

• • Domestic popularity and political equilibrium are important signals to major-power policymakers. If the officeholder enjoys higher acceptability among local people, foreign partners gain confidence in investment and security planning. According to current surveys/sentiment lines, the Awami League/Hasina remains the strongest; hence, major actors consider Hasina more acceptable. In the final section of the article, we will present robust empirical evidence on popularity.

5.a.3. Regional clearing

• • In India-oriented corridors and sea-based policies, Delhi wants Dhaka to cooperate “freely” but “predictably.” Hasina can establish effective interlocks with Delhi, fostering a sustainable mutual trust and benefit in that relationship; actors opposed to Hasina, especially Yunus and particularly the Pakistan/Jamaat camp, can generate potential conflict here. BNP also creates another conflict dynamic under the rules of this game, but among all actors, the interlocking relationships that the major powers have with Hasina/Awami League are far more favourable than with others.

5.a.4. Reducing legal and security costs

• • A coalition linked to Jamaat/Pakistan can carry allegations of terrorism, legal uncertainty, and international pressure factors that raise foreign partners’ “cooperation costs.” Under Hasina, these risks are comparatively lower.

5.a.5. Multilateral options and cover

• • Hasina may not be directly “pro-U.S.”; even so, she can work through multilateral frameworks, India/Japan/ADB/JICA/IMF/World Bank to secure consent domestically. This is advantageous to foreign actors (sovereignty preserved, outcomes delivered). Under the Yunus coalition, exclusive or controversial concessions can sometimes be extracted quickly, something the major powers dislike.

5.b Game Theory: Payoff / Acceptance Matrix
Table title: Why each actor finds Hasina more acceptable (in brief)

In short, under Hasina, there may be less access to assets such as corridors, ports, and islands, but a lower risk and greater durability, which foreign actors perceive as far more advantageous in terms of regional priorities. Under the Yunus-centric bloc, even if concessions or discounts (access to assets) are greater, the problems of durability and legitimacy make that option unacceptable to the great powers. We will discuss this further later.

5. c Example or case statement: Great powers do not fall in love with countries where they invest their money and security, where there is reliable delivery. Hasina’s administrative continuity and local acceptability ensure reliability; therefore, India, the United States, China, and Russia, though they will employ different strategies for different reasons, will, in terms of interest, accept Hasina’s status. Conversely, if the Yunus bloc includes BNP/Tarique, NCP, Jamaat, and Pakistan links, political risk and legal uncertainty increase, so foreign partners will regard that alternative as of low acceptability.

Let the players be {U.S., India, China, Russia, Bangladesh-Regime}.

• • Previously, the “Yunus card” offered some actors the convenience of soft pressure/moral posturing.
  • With the India–U.S. pact and the prioritization of IPEF/corridors, the payoff matrix has changed:

    • • U.S./India: want “lower risk + faster execution” → Hasina > Yunus
      • China/Russia (hedging): want a “predictable partner” → lower deal cost with Hasina
        Result: Keeping Yunus to extract “obedient” service does not yield a systemic payoff; choosing Hasina yields a higher total payoff.

5.d ‘Obedience’ versus ‘credibility’: why “mere compliance does not equal acceptability.”

• • The Yunus government is “compliant” toward the United States that is, willing to follow U.S. preferences, offering corridor/island agreements, and so on.
  • But it is not “acceptable,” because:

    • • it has no popular base,
      • it has weak capacity, and
      • It is unstable or opportunistic.

By contrast,

• • The Hasina government may not accept every U.S. condition,
    But it has institutional predictability, governance capacity, and popular legitimacy. Therefore, it is internationally “acceptable,” even if not “compliant.”

In brief

• • Compliance (agreeing in word/gesture) ≠ Credibility (delivering on the ground).
  • Foreign powers want: keeping schedules, legal assurance, and bureaucratic continuity.
  • In the Yunus regime, there is a credibility gap for three reasons:
    a) Weak legitimacy → risk of internal resistance/policy reversal; lack of public support.
    b) Low capacity → slow implementation in ports/data/tax standards.
    c) Uncertain continuity → long-term concessions/corridors become costly.
  • In Hasina’s prior experience, consistency and state capacity are proven, and legitimacy and public support are greater; as a result, major actors view her as a lower transaction-cost partner.

5.e. India’s veto-weight + America’s risk-minimization

• • The India–U.S. strategic embrace means India’s preferences now set Washington’s norms.
  • To run India-priority corridors (BBIN, Northeast, seaports), a stable Dhaka is needed → Hasina is the natural choice.
  • From the U.S. side, too: risk minimization → a predictable regime over “interim fragility.”

5.f. China–Russia hedge: ‘a stable counterpart is better’

• • China wants corridor/industrial park/port deals with contract enforcement.
  • Russia seeks long-horizon energy/defence financing.
  • Both follow a non-ideological logic: “the partner who gets things done” by this test, Hasina > Yunus.

5.g. Narrative/legitimacy market: external signals → internal pricing

• • When international coverage and diplomatic tone shift, prices in the domestic legitimacy market move.
  • According to Figure 3 (media visibility) and the argument, Yunus ↓, Hasina ↑ → external signals “price up” acceptability for Hasina at home.

5.h. Demonstrated popularity: “AL/Hasina remains the most popular”

• • Selectorate theory says: a durable regime = large winning coalition + delivery of public goods.
  • Public sentiment: Awami > BNP > Yunus-Regime (overall trend) → seen by external players as lower risk.
  • Popularity = a proxy for policy durability; hence, in the four powers’ cost-benefit calculus, signing off on Hasina is easier.

Here’s a faithful, line-by-line English translation of your passage:

One-line causal chain
World System (US–India tilt + CN/RU hedge) → Corridor/Standard Priority → not Compliance, but Credibility needed → Yunus = capacity/continuity risk; Hasina = predictable delivery → External signal shifts legitimacy → Hasina acceptable; Yunus refused.

Four-Corner “Actor Shift”

Political implications

• • Even if Yunus displays “obedience,” the world system today prioritizes delivery.
  • In the game-theory equation, the payoff shift has made Hasina the “least risk, most delivery” option.
  • Add domestic popularity to that, and it further lowers the political cost for external players.
    Hence, the “common divisor” for the four big players is Hasina, and Yunus is a “high-volatility asset.”

6. Social power / narrative market: agenda-setting and the “legitimacy market”

International media are agenda setters. When Washington’s strategy turns toward Delhi, coverage becomes stability-centric as well.

• • Chart 3 shows: Yunus-visibility is decreasing, while Hasina-visibility is rising.
  • The linkage is this: media narrative → diplomatic tone → investor sentiment → domestic legitimacy one pipeline.
    As a result, Hasina is repriced in the market as the “responsible option,” while Yunus is a “high-volatility asset.”
    The discussion above demonstrates that, on the South Asian stage of power and interests, an alignment has emerged, with the game operating within the global system of power. We depict the whole matter below in Figure 5.

7. Sheik Hasina’s international re-entry
After a long silence, Sheik Hasina gave interviews to three international media outlets (Reuters, The Independent, DW) within a single week, which clearly amounts to a “diplomatic re-entry.”

• • She said, “No election in Bangladesh is possible without the Awami League.”
  • She directly questioned the “illegitimacy” of the current interim government.
  • In her interview with DW, she said, “I am accountable to the people, not to foreign pressure.”

This is not merely personal defence; it is a policy message that under the new India–United States equation, Sheikh Hasina remains South Asia’s most popular and politically seasoned leader.

Why is this bad news for the Yunus regime

• • International distrust: U.S. policymakers now recognize that a Yunus-led transition “cannot deliver stability.”
  • Pakistan card fails: Yunus long sought Pakistan’s sympathy and U.S. forbearance, but the U.S. now situates Pakistan within an India-centric region.
  • Neoliberal logic: The United States prioritizes interests, not individuals. An India-led South Asia is more profitable for the U.S. economically and strategically.
  • Legitimacy crisis: On social media (Facebook Sentiment Dataset, Das 2025), during July–October 2025, negative reactions toward the Yunus government exceed 70%, whereas positive reactions toward Sheikh Hasina are far higher, at 70–98%.

Here we briefly analyze public opinion on three Facebook news items, all related to Sheikh Hasina’s recent interviews:

7.1. “Press Secretary’s statement on the Prime Minister’s interview” (Prothom Alo): In the pie chart (Figure 6) of 1,436 opinions (1,436 people), the blue section (99% of opinions) shows that social-media users overwhelmingly rejected the Press Secretary’s comments; we present selected comments for readers here.

7.2. “Hasina’s talk of elections is improper, say politicians” (BBC): In the pie chart (Figure 7) of 1,609 opinions (1,609 people), the blue section (88% of opinions) shows that social-media users largely rejected the story; selected comments are presented here.

7.3. “Hasina’s statement amid various rumours” (BBC): Of a total of 5,176 people’s opinions, 73% directly expressed confidence in the Awami League and Sheikh Hasina (see Figure 8).

8. Finally, our theoretical conclusion

8.a. Game theory – Strategic Triangle

The above analysis closely aligns with a fundamental concept in game theory, the Nash equilibrium, suggesting that Hasina has precedence over Yunus. Based on coordinates drawn from various organizations (e.g., World Bank, V-Dem, ACLED, Reuters), the acceptability of Hasina and Yunus is presented below, calculated by comparing asset access and durability. Compared to other competitors, although Hasina is less willing to grant foreign powers access to assets (Accessibility 0.40 for Hasina versus 0.70 for Yunus), her capacity and competence are far ahead in ensuring the durable sustainability of whatever is granted (Durability 0.85 for Hasina versus 0.40 for Yunus). By these two measures, Hasina’s acceptability is much higher (see * versus X).

8.b Cultural Inertia & Popular Legitimacy

• • Bangladeshi public opinion is still rooted in the 1971 independence-centric narrative; that cultural inertia grants political legitimacy to Hasina, but not to Yunus.
  • When foreign powers invest in a regime without public support, a legitimacy gap is created, which ultimately backfires (Scott, 1990; Keane, 2018).

The new India–U.S. agreement has changed South Asia’s power geometry. The United States now understands that the Yunus regime neither enjoys legitimacy nor ensures stability; by contrast, Sheik Hasina’s leadership, India-friendly posture, and public support are the necessary ingredients for stability in South Asia.

9. Conclusion

The recent strategic embrace between India and the United States has reset South Asia’s power geometry in a way that prioritizes durability, not access i.e., policy continuity, administrative capacity, and social acceptability over the superior currency. In this new balance, Dr. Yunus’s “high-access, low-durability” profile is synonymous with risk to international partners, while Sheik Hasina’s “moderate-access, high-durability” profile leads on the acceptability metric. The trade/engagement trends, media signals, and access–durability matrices in Figures 5–9 consistently point to the same conclusion: Washington–Delhi tilt ≠ Dhaka-agnostic; rather, Delhi-anchored stability requires a predictable Dhaka, where Hasina is the “stable hand,” and Yunus the “volatile asset.”

In game-theory terms, the payoff matrix has shifted. The four major powers’ shared goals, corridor security, supply-chain rules, and contract enforcement naturally bias them toward the partner with the lowest transaction costs. Even if debates over justice or moral posturing inflate the political atmosphere, in the real world, compliance ≠ does not equal credibility. On paper, the Yunus camp may display “access,” but deficits of legitimacy and continuity make that access costly; by contrast, Hasina’s record discounts deliverable predictability, so in a Nash-like equilibrium, the Hasina choice emerges as the least-risk/most-delivery option.

This structural shift has been accelerated by signals from the narrative market. International coverage and diplomatic tone shifts (Figure 3) change prices in the domestic legitimacy market, pricing up Hasina and discounting Yunus. Bangladesh’s cultural inertia, the 1971-centred national narrative already nudges the base of public support in one direction; that is, popular legitimacy is a proxy for policy durability, which further simplifies external stakeholders’ risk calculus.

Therefore, the three most pragmatic lessons for Bangladesh right now are

1. 1. Stability is currency: International partners do not buy “access-at-any-cost,” they buy predictable delivery.
   2. India-anchored architecture: If Bangladesh can demonstrate continuity in BBIN/IPEF/logistics standards, India-mediated platforms reduce costs and raise acceptability.
   3. Institutional continuity: Consistency across courts, contracts, customs/data standards lowers the risk premium and makes investment and security cooperation sustainable.

The bottom line in today’s South Asian game is that trust beats politeness; outcomes beat obedience. In this Delhi-facing phase of Washington’s strategy, the natural carrier of an outcome-centric, low-friction, high-durability path for Bangladesh is Sheik Hasina, hence both the cooling shadow over the Yunus regime and the green light ahead of Hasina are logical consequences of this World System of Power.

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The author is a Professor of Homeland Security,

Elizabeth City State University, North Carolina, USA