Theocratic Autocracy and the Death of Secular Democracy: Neo-Fascist Drift in Bangladesh’s Interim Government

Ahsan Sayeed

Executive Summary

This report critically examines the political transformation of Bangladesh following the collapse of the Awami League (AL) government in August 2024 and the rise of the interim regime led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus. While the AL government had increasingly concentrated power and curtailed dissent, it nevertheless maintained the formal structures of electoral democracy, constitutional order, and secular pluralist ideology rooted in the nation’s 1971 Liberation War. The sudden fall of this system marked a praetorian rupture—an institutional breakdown that ushered in a radical, ideologically charged regime with distinct neo-fascist characteristics.

The interim government has demonstrated a systematic dismantling of secular democratic foundations. This includes the ideological rewriting of history to emphasize religious orthodoxy over the Liberation War’s secular and nationalist ideals. Statements from Dr. Yunus and senior regime figures have openly declared an intention to “reset” the nation’s historical memory, a hallmark of fascist regimes described by Eco (1995) as the manipulation of tradition and rejection of modernism. Simultaneously, a personality cult around Dr. Yunus is being constructed through state propaganda and digital machinery. Despite lacking the populist charisma of classical dictators, Yunus has been mythologized as an infallible visionary and national saviour, immune to criticism—a tactic consistent with fascist leadership models.

Economically, the regime has fused state power with corporate-oligarchic interests. Key financial sectors are being handed to regime-aligned conglomerates and foreign investors, while allegations of large-scale plundering—particularly from the stock market and banking system—have surfaced, signalling the emergence of authoritarian capitalism (Gramsci, 1971). This neo-fascist drift is reinforced by repression of dissent, persecution of minorities, erosion of judicial independence, and militarization of governance. Islamist movements and radical factions previously marginalized have resurfaced, emboldened by the regime’s ideological alignment.

The report concludes that unless checked by domestic resistance or international pressure, Bangladesh risks sliding into a full theocratic autocracy—abandoning its secular, democratic heritage and embracing a dangerous model of religiously justified authoritarian rule.

Introduction

The political transformation of Bangladesh in the aftermath of the August 2024 ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s government marks a watershed moment in the country’s post-independence trajectory—one that signifies the collapse of its secular democratic foundations and the disturbing rise of a theocratic autocracy. What was once a flawed but resilient model of secular democracy under the AL has now deteriorated into an unaccountable and ideologically radical interim regime, exemplifying what scholars like Cas Mudde (2019) and Juan Linz (2000) describe as a ‘neo-fascist drift’—a process in which democratic institutions are systematically hollowed out, civil liberties are suppressed, and political power becomes inseparably entwined with religious orthodoxy.

Under Sheikh Hasina’s rule, despite the concentration of executive power, electoral manipulation, and restrictions on dissent, the constitutional order, parliamentary framework, and secular pluralist ideology rooted in Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War remained nominally intact. The AL’s political legitimacy, though contested, was grounded in the formal preservation of electoral democracy, space for civic resistance, and secular nationalism—a project that, however flawed, sought to shield the state from theocratic encroachment.

In sharp contrast, the interim regime led by Chief Advisor Dr. Muhammad Yunus represents a historic rupture from this political tradition. Informed by the logic of authoritarian personal rule (Linz, 2000) and the ideological blueprint of Umberto Eco’s (1995) concept of Ur-Fascism, the regime has swiftly dismantled electoral institutions, criminalized secular opposition, and elevated radical Islamist and ultra-nationalist forces into state power structures. Its aggressive redefinition of national identity—rooted in religious exclusivism, mythicized history, and militant populism—signals the emergence of what Gramsci (1971) might term a new hegemonic project: one designed to reshape society’s common sense through religious orthodoxy and state-sponsored ideological coercion.

This theocratic-autocratic fusion is not merely a drift toward illiberalism; it represents the systematic death of secular democracy in Bangladesh. The regime’s promotion of anti-Indian xenophobia, institutional persecution of religious minorities, glorification of Islamist militants, and revisionist erasure of the 1971 Liberation legacy reflects a deliberate state strategy of social engineering aimed at creating an exclusionary, Islamist-dominated political order. Such developments sharply echo the traits of fascist governance patterns: populist mobilization, paramilitary vigilante violence, demonization of the “Other,” and symbolic political mythology—phenomena explored extensively in the works of Griffin (1991) and Paxton (2004).

This report critically examines the neo-fascist trajectory of the interim government, warning that Bangladesh stands on the precipice of an enduring theocratic autocracy. Unless domestic democratic forces and the international community intervene to halt this descent, the nation risks permanent rupture from its founding principles of secular nationalism, pluralistic tolerance, and republican democracy. What was once an incomplete, imperfect secular polity now faces the danger of irreversible transformation into an authoritarian, religiously homogenized state—an outcome with grave implications for regional peace, minority rights, and the future of democracy in South Asia.

Context and Background

The Praetorian Trap: Institutional Fragility and Extra-Constitutional Change

The unexpected rise of Bangladesh’s interim regime in August 2024 did not result from an organic democratic process, but from the dynamics of a deeply flawed political system—a condition that Samuel P. Huntington (1968) characterized as a “praetorian state.” In such a system, the weakness of political institutions prevents the peaceful mediation of societal conflicts, allowing informal actors—particularly the military, religious networks, and oligarchic interests—to intervene directly in governance. The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government marked a praetorian rupture in Bangladesh’s political order. The formal structures of parliamentary democracy were set aside by an alliance of domestic and external forces, bypassing constitutional processes and civilian mandates.

Under Hasina, Bangladesh’s hybrid regime, though flawed, maintained electoral and constitutional forms, preserving at least the façade of secular, pluralistic governance. The ouster of her government marked the triumph of informal power arrangements over formal democratic mechanisms, laying bare the vulnerability of Bangladesh’s institutional architecture.

Foreign Manipulation: The Geopolitical Designs of the US Deep State

Externally, influential sections of the United States’ so-called Deep State—comprising elements of its intelligence, corporate, and diplomatic machinery—viewed Hasina’s government as an impediment to reshaping South Asia’s strategic balance. Her proximity to India, resistance to Western-driven labor market reforms, and steadfast secular nationalism were obstacles to the West’s vision of Bangladesh as a pliant geopolitical client state.

Echoing Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman’s “manufacturing consent” thesis (1988), Western media and think tanks subtly reframed the Hasina regime as a case of unchecked authoritarianism and democratic decay. These narratives concealed deeper geopolitical motives: to engineer a regime change that would open Bangladesh’s markets, weaken Indian regional influence, and create space for Islamist or pliant conservative forces more amenable to Western security designs. This manipulation shaped the international environment to justify and normalize the erosion of Hasina’s authority, while veiling the larger strategic calculus at play.

The Islamist-Extremist Resurgence: Domestic Reactionary Forces Reawakened

Domestically, this external pressure converged with the resurgence of long-suppressed Islamist movements, criminal-political networks, and the sidelined opposition. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), Hefazat-e-Islami (HeI), Islami Andolon Bangladesh (IAB), Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT), Ansar-al-Islam (AAI)—a proscribed pro-Al Qaeda outfit—and other radical factions found renewed momentum amid the anti-government agitations of mid-2024. Previously discredited electorally and marginalized institutionally under Hasina’s secular regime, these forces seized upon the July movement as an opportunity to stage a counter-revolution under the guise of popular dissent.

As Antonio Gramsci’s theory of “passive revolution” suggests, these elite-driven movements disguised themselves as spontaneous civic uprisings but in fact pursued a reactionary agenda: dismantling secular democracy to pave the way for a theocratic and authoritarian order. The July protests thus became a tool for destabilizing the state from within, amplifying chaos to justify the emergence of a non-democratic alternative to the AL’s flawed but legitimate government.

From Secularism to Theocratic Autocracy: Filling the Ideological Vacuum

The fall of the AL left an ideological vacuum that was quickly filled by Islamist and ultranationalist narratives. Instead of restoring democratic pluralism, the interim regime empowered religious hardliners and extremist groups long hostile to Bangladesh’s secular foundations. The fragile balance between state and religion collapsed, as Islamist forces were incorporated into state apparatuses, educational reforms, and public culture.

This transformation echoes Gramsci’s warning that when progressive hegemonies falter, regressive ones rise in their place, replacing secular nationalism with theocratic autocracy. The interim government’s tacit alliance with Islamist factions set Bangladesh on a path toward ideological homogenization and religious orthodoxy, reversing the secular achievements of the post-1971 republic.

The Neo-Fascist Mutation: Toward an Authoritarian Social Order

The result of these converging dynamics is what Umberto Eco (1995) described as “Ur-Fascism”—an ideological and operational structure marked by ultra-nationalism, the glorification of militarism, the suppression of dissent, and the cult of purity and tradition. The interim regime rapidly embraced these traits: it fostered xenophobic nationalism, vilified minorities and secularists, and legitimized vigilante violence by paramilitary groups such as Tawhidi Janata and July Unity, Inqilab Manch, etc.

Far from a transitional caretaker government, the interim regime evolved into an openly neo-fascist project—demolishing electoral institutions, militarizing civil society, and rewriting national history to glorify religious orthodoxy and political exclusion. The transition from Hasina’s flawed secular regime to Yunus’s neo-fascist autocracy reflects the danger that Huntington warned of in praetorian systems: that power vacuums do not foster democracy but rather invite the domination of society through force, ideology, and fear.

The Neo-Fascist Characteristics of the Interim Regime

Ethno-Religious Nationalism: Constructing a New Mythology of the State

One of the defining features of the interim regime’s ideological orientation is its deployment of exclusionary ethno-religious nationalism—a hallmark of what Umberto Eco (1995) termed “Ur-Fascism.” The regime systematically reconstructs national identity by privileging Sunni Islamist narratives while erasing or marginalizing the secular, pluralist, and liberation-centric ethos that underpinned Bangladesh’s 1971 founding (Eco, 1995). The state’s media, education system, and public commemorations increasingly propagate a revisionist history that downplays the role of secular forces in favour of Islamic symbols and martyrs. The deliberate exclusion of Hindu, Christian, Buddhist, and secular Muslim contributions to the national struggle reflects an attempt to manufacture a homogenous, purified identity essential for fascist state-building. This mythic past becomes the moral justification for present authoritarian practices.

Suppression of Dissent: Criminalization of Opposition and Civil Society

A second feature of the regime’s neo-fascist character is its systematic suppression of political opposition and civil society actors. Echoing both Gramsci’s notion of “hegemonic coercion” and Eco’s warning against dissent-intolerant systems, the interim government has criminalized criticism under vague security laws, suppressed independent media outlets, and dismantled secular civil society organizations (Gramsci, 1971; Eco, 1995).

Journalists, human rights defenders, and opposition politicians—particularly those aligned with secular or leftist movements—have been subjected to arbitrary detention, digital surveillance, and extrajudicial harassment (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2025). The state’s monopoly over public discourse ensures that only government-sanctioned narratives circulate freely, creating an environment of fear and self-censorship.

Paramilitary Mobilization: The Rise of Vigilante and Militia Forces

A third neo-fascist trait is the cultivation of paramilitary and vigilante formations that operate alongside or beyond formal state institutions. The emergence of groups such as the Tawhidi Janata, July Unity, Inqilab Manch, and other Islamist street forces reveals a deliberate strategy of societal militarization (Asia Times, 2025).

This mirrors Eco’s description of fascist regimes’ reliance on “the cult of action for action’s sake” and glorification of violence as a purifying force (Eco, 1995). The regime’s outsourcing of coercion to informal militias allows it to maintain plausible deniability while ensuring grassroots-level terror and compliance—a hallmark of totalitarian and fascist systems historically seen in Mussolini’s Blackshirts and Hitler’s SA (Paxton, 2004).

State Militarization: The Army’s Ambiguous Role and Civil-Military Fusion

While officially under civilian interim leadership, the regime demonstrates a deepening fusion of military and civil authority, consistent with Huntington’s “praetorian” warning (Huntington, 1968). The army’s political neutrality has been compromised as segments of the military leadership tacitly or actively endorse the regime’s consolidation in exchange for expanded economic privileges, budgetary control, and policy influence (International Crisis Group, 2025).

Defence institutions are increasingly politicized, with military-run enterprises, media channels, and civic programs used to propagate regime ideology. This creeping militarization of governance reflects a structural feature of neo-fascist systems: the dissolution of the civilian-military divide, where the armed forces become both guardians and beneficiaries of the authoritarian state.

Erasure of Secular Liberation History: The Ideological Reprogramming of the Nation

A cornerstone of the regime’s neo-fascist transformation is its systematic assault on Bangladesh’s secular and Liberation War legacy. Through state-sponsored historical revisionism, the regime is actively displacing the secular, socialist, and nationalist principles that once formed the foundation of the nation’s identity with a narrative steeped in religious orthodoxy (The Diplomat, 2025). This effort closely aligns with Umberto Eco’s concepts of “the rejection of modernism” and “the cult of tradition” (Eco, 1995), where the past is mythologized to serve authoritarian ends. By reconstructing history to validate its present theocratic and autocratic project, the regime severs the population from alternative democratic and progressive traditions that could inspire dissent. Reflecting this intention openly, Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus declared on several occasions—including in a September 2024 interview with Voice of America—that the government was determined to “press the reset button” to erase Bangladesh’s historical memory and chart a new ideological course.

Personality Cult Construction: Mythologizing the Interim Leadership

Despite lacking the personal charisma associated with classical fascist dictators, the interim leadership—particularly figures such as Dr. Muhammad Yunus—has been elevated to an almost sacrosanct moral stature through pervasive state-sponsored propaganda (Freedom House, 2025). Official media and government narratives portray Yunus as a visionary reformer and a global saviour, using his international accolades to justify the regime’s authoritarian consolidation under the guise of technocratic virtue. This reflects Umberto Eco’s warning about the fabrication of “an infallible leader,” whose perceived wisdom and benevolence become immune to public scrutiny, dissent, or criticism—any challenge to whom is cast as betrayal or subversion of the national interest (Eco, 1995). State-controlled machinery, particularly automated social media campaigns, aggressively promotes this myth, circulating narratives that present Dr. Yunus as the greatest figure the subcontinent has produced in nearly a century, a saviour destined to rescue the nation from its past failures.

Economic Authoritarianism: Corporate-Oligarchic Consolidation of Power

The regime’s neo-fascist drift is equally evident in the economic domain, where state power is increasingly fused with corporate and oligarchic interests in collaboration with foreign capital (Mudde, 2024). Under the rhetoric of “reform”, “stabilization”, and “foreign investment promotion”, critical sectors such as banking, the stock market, infrastructure, and energy have been systematically transferred to regime-aligned business conglomerates and foreign investors, marginalizing independent entrepreneurs, small businesses, and labour unions. This corporate-statist nexus reflects models of “authoritarian capitalism,” in which economic liberalization serves not public welfare but the consolidation of elite wealth and the suppression of worker resistance, as warned by Gramsci (1971). In the ten months since the interim government assumed power, over 30,000 crore taka has reportedly been siphoned from the stock market alone through manipulative practices benefiting regime-favored business circles. Similar patterns of financial exploitation and capital flight have been observed across the banking and broader financial sectors, where select oligarchic networks enjoy privileged access and impunity, deepening economic inequality and public discontent.

The Future of Bangladesh under the Neo-Fascist Regime: Possible Scenarios

The consolidation of neo-fascist governance structures in post-2024 Bangladesh signals a deeply uncertain and volatile trajectory for the nation’s political, social, and economic future. While authoritarian regimes often present an outward appearance of stability, their inner contradictions, repressive practices, and socio-political distortions generate a range of possible outcomes. Drawing upon historical precedents, comparative political analysis, and Bangladesh’s unique socio-political landscape, at least four plausible scenarios may emerge.

Entrenchment of Authoritarian Stability: The “Managed Autocracy” Scenario

In this scenario, the interim regime led by Chief Advisor Dr. Muhammad Yunus—sustained by a strategic alliance of Islamist factions, praetorian military elements, and entrenched corporate oligarchs—successfully entrenches its authoritarian rule by systematically restructuring Bangladesh’s political landscape into a form of “managed democracy,” akin to the illiberal models seen in Putin’s Russia or Erdoğan’s Turkey (Levitsky & Way, 2010). This consolidation would involve the permanent suppression of secular political forces, particularly the AL, alongside formalized partnerships with Islamist groups such as JeI, IAB and HeI. The regime would monopolize key state instruments—media, education, and religious bodies—to engineer an ideologically conformist populace while militarizing the economy and employing paramilitary organizations like Tawhidi Janata and Inqilab Manch to maintain grassroots social control (Eco, 1995). Though this arrangement may offer superficial stability and economic predictability attractive to foreign actors such as China or elements within the US Deep State, it would inevitably deepen Bangladesh’s democratic regression, exacerbate societal divisions, and sow the seeds for future unrest and political volatility (Freedom House, 2025).

Spiral into Violent Instability and Sectarian Conflict: ‘Lebanese Model’

Bangladesh may spiral into prolonged instability resembling the Lebanese civil war model, characterized by pervasive sectarian conflict and societal fragmentation. Rising tensions between Sunni Islamist factions, religious minorities such as Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, Sufis and Ahmadis, as well as secular and progressive groups, could erupt into widespread violence and targeted persecution. Marginalized ethnic and regional communities—particularly in the Chittagong Hill Tracts—may respond by forming armed resistance movements, igniting localized insurgencies aimed at defending their autonomy and cultural identity (Amnesty International, 2025). Simultaneously, the collapse of central law enforcement capabilities would allow extremist paramilitary groups like Tawhidi Janata and Inqilab Manch to function as de facto local authorities in various districts, replacing state governance with factional rule. This fragmentation of political authority and public order would paralyze governance, deter foreign investment, and trigger a mass exodus of refugees, echoing the tragic state failures witnessed in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan following regime disintegration (UNHCR, 2025).

Civil-Military Showdown and Military Coup (The “Praetorian Correction” Scenario)

As Samuel P. Huntington (1968) cautioned in his analysis of praetorian states, when the military’s institutional autonomy is threatened or its core interests are sidelined by civilian authoritarian regimes or encroaching Islamist power centers, the likelihood of military intervention rises sharply. In Bangladesh, a rupture could occur if segments of the army leadership become increasingly alarmed by the erosion of state professionalism and the growing dominance of Islamist factions within governance structures. Economic discontent among the lower ranks—stemming from perceptions of favouritism toward regime-backed Islamist militias—may further destabilize military cohesion. Additionally, sustained international pressure, particularly from India or key Western powers, could encourage the military to reassert control in a bid to avert complete state failure. Such a scenario would parallel the “corrective coups” witnessed in Pakistan (1999) or Egypt (2013), potentially leading either to the restoration of a technocratic-military caretaker administration or, conversely, to the entrenchment of a deeper, more overt military authoritarianism, depending on the motives and unity of the interventionist leadership.

Popular Democratic Uprising (The “Counter-Revolution” Scenario)

Despite the interim regime’s severe repression, the possibility of a mass popular uprising cannot be ruled out. Mounting public anger, fueled by widespread economic hardship resulting from oligarchic exploitation and the domination of foreign capital (International Crisis Group, 2025), may reach a breaking point. Marginalized groups—including religious minorities, secular youth, progressive activists, and disenfranchised working classes—could unite in resistance against the regime’s aggressive theocratic and neo-fascist transformation of the state. Moreover, internal cracks within the regime’s Islamist alliances or growing discord among elite factions could weaken the regime’s authoritarian cohesion, creating an opening for rebellion. Such an uprising could bear resemblance to Bangladesh’s 1990 pro-democracy movement or the mass mobilizations of the Arab Spring, though history warns that these movements are inherently volatile—vulnerable to co-option, suppression, or collapse unless they garner decisive support from key military factions or influential international actors (Bayat, 2013).

A Fragile and Dangerous Road Ahead

The future of Bangladesh under its current neo-fascist trajectory remains precarious and unstable. While the regime may hope for long-term survival through coercion and propaganda, the contradictions of ethno-religious ultra-nationalism, economic exclusion, and the erosion of civil-military balance make such stability unlikely in the long run. Historically, regimes that combine theocratic zeal with military praetorianism and corporate oligarchy—such as Mussolini’s Italy, Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan, or Pinochet’s Chile—have faced eventual collapse or violent upheaval. Bangladesh appears to be hurtling toward one of these fates, unless deliberate internal or external corrective interventions reshape its political future.

 Conclusion

The fall of Sheikh Hasina’s AL government in August 2024 and the subsequent rise of the interim regime under Dr. Muhammad Yunus marked not a democratic transition but a decisive rupture with the secular, pluralist foundations of Bangladesh’s statehood. As this report has demonstrated, the regime’s ideological trajectory, institutional restructuring, and socio-political practices reflect a profound and dangerous descent into what can only be described as neo-fascism, characterized by the fusion of theocratic autocracy, praetorian militarism, and corporate oligarchy.

The systematic erosion of electoral democracy, the suppression of dissent, the militarization of civil society, and the construction of a mythic ethno-religious nationalism have replaced the constitutional and secular framework that once defined the republic. Inspired by the theoretical warnings of Umberto Eco, Antonio Gramsci, Samuel Huntington, and Noam Chomsky, this report has laid bare how Bangladesh’s interim regime replicates the core features of classical fascist and totalitarian systems, though adapted to the local context of South Asian politics and Islamist populism.

The interim government’s alliance with reactionary Islamist forces such as JeI, IAB, HeI, HuT and AAI, its patronage of paramilitary and vigilante groups, and its active revision of the country’s Liberation War history serve not to renew democratic life but to bury its memory. The destruction of the secular liberation narrative—the very soul of 1971—marks a chilling cultural reprogramming aimed at producing a compliant, religiously homogenized citizenry stripped of historical agency.

Moreover, the regime’s economic policies, favouring corporate monopolies and foreign capital at the expense of local entrepreneurship and labour rights, deepen socioeconomic inequalities and heighten public discontent. This combination of ideological repression and economic disenfranchisement renders future social upheaval almost inevitable, whether in the form of mass popular revolt, elite fragmentation, or descent into chronic instability and sectarian violence.

The death of secular democracy in Bangladesh, as this report concludes, is not merely the collapse of electoral institutions but the suffocation of an entire civic and cultural ethos that once held the promise of a pluralist, progressive, and sovereign republic. Unless countervailing domestic resistance, military realignment, or decisive international intervention emerges, the country risks hardening into a theocratic autocracy cloaked in populist rhetoric and sustained by repression—a neo-fascist model with dangerous implications for regional stability, minority rights, and the future of democracy in South

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   The author is a University Professor