Echoes Of The BNP–Jamaat Era: Extremist Resurgence Under Bangladesh’s Interim Government

P.  Zahsan

Executive Summary

Bangladesh’s progress in fighting terrorism over the last two decades is now in danger under the interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus. While government leaders claim there is “no terrorism” in the country, this view is contradicted by credible intelligence reports, police records, and warnings from foreign diplomats. The government’s actions—such as releasing convicted extremists, not opposing bail for dangerous individuals, and weakening key counterterrorism agencies—have created an environment where extremist groups can grow again.

In recent months, militants have joined mainstream Islamist political parties, rebuilt links with foreign terrorist networks, reopened training camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and started recruiting young people to fight abroad in Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the same time, the ability to fight terrorism has weakened because of poor coordination between agencies, the removal of skilled officers, and legal action taken against past security operations.

The risk is even greater because of the large number of missing guns, ammunition, and escaped high-risk prisoners from the 2024 unrest. Together, these factors—political protection for extremists, weaker security forces, and the spread of radical ideas—could push Bangladesh toward a situation similar to Afghanistan’s under religious rule. If urgent action is not taken now, future governments will have to deal with extremists firmly entrenched in politics, society, and even parts of the security forces, making the problem far more difficult to solve.

1. Methodology and Sources Caveat

This report uses open sources, media reports, expert interviews, and limited confidential inputs. Information was cross-checked where possible, but some details could not be fully verified due to restricted reporting environments. Findings reflect the situation at the time of writing and may change as new information emerges. The inclusion of unverified elements is intended to highlight emerging risks rather than present definitive conclusions. Readers are advised to interpret the findings with awareness of these limitations.

2. Introduction

Bangladesh’s fight against terrorism has been long and difficult, with moments of progress followed by dangerous setbacks. In the early 2000s, during the BNP–Jamaat government, groups like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) and Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) operated freely, often with political protection. This weakened law enforcement and allowed extremist networks to grow unchecked.

When the Awami League returned to power in 2009, it adopted a zero-tolerance approach to terrorism and put strong pressure on these groups. The 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack—carried out by ISIS-linked Neo-JMB and killing 22 people, including 17 foreigners—was a turning point. The government launched a nationwide crackdown, arrested or killed many militants, dismantled their networks, and improved overall security. From 2017 onward, terrorist attacks in Bangladesh became very rare.

However, after the AL was removed in August 2024, many of these gains were lost. The interim government not only denied the presence of militancy but also took steps that helped extremists regain strength—such as releasing convicted militants, weakening dedicated counterterrorism units, and reducing cooperation between security agencies.

This report compares the current situation with the BNP–Jamaat era from 2001 to 2006. It shows how denial by the government, direct political support for extremists, and weakened institutions are allowing militant groups to rebuild quietly. The findings underline the urgent need for a long-term, coordinated, and politically independent counterterrorism strategy to stop Bangladesh from sliding toward extremist control.

3. Historical Context

3.1 The BNP–Jamaat Era (2001–2006)
During the BNP–Jamaat coalition government, extremist groups such as HuJI-B and JMB grew stronger with both open and hidden political support. Law enforcement agencies were often pressured by political leaders not to take action, and senior BNP figures were reported to have intervened to secure the release of arrested militants. This permissive environment allowed extremists to build strong networks, recruit members, and run training camps without fear of being stopped. As a result, Bangladesh saw some of its worst terrorist attacks, including the grenade attack on an opposition rally led by Sheikh Hasina, the 2004 attack on former British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury by HuJI-B, countrywide coordinated bomb blasts, and suicide attacks targeting judges, courts, and police in 2005 carried out by JMB. From 2001 to 2005, numerous such incidents shook the country. These events also damaged Bangladesh’s reputation abroad. U.S. diplomatic cables, later published by WikiLeaks, confirmed that banned militant groups enjoyed protection from top levels of government, further weakening Bangladesh’s counterterrorism credibility.

3.2 AL’s Counterterrorism Drive (2009–August 2024)
When the AL returned to power in 2009, it declared a “zero tolerance” policy against terrorism, passed new anti-terrorism laws and rules, and launched a long-term campaign to dismantle extremist networks built during the BNP–Jamaat period. A major turning point came on July 1, 2016, when ISIS-linked terrorists attacked the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka, killing 20 hostages—most of them foreigners. This tragedy led to the creation of specialized counterterrorism units such as the Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit and later the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU). The Rapid Action Battalion’s (RAB) counterterrorism wing was strengthened, and intelligence capabilities were expanded in agencies like the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Bureau (CTIB) of the Director General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the Special Branch’s (SB) Counterterrorism Wing, and the National Security Intelligence’s (NSI) Counterterrorism Unit. The government also established dedicated anti-terrorism tribunals to speed up the prosecution of terrorism-related cases. A nationwide crackdown followed, involving the police, RAB, and intelligence agencies. Over the next several years, many militants were killed in armed confrontations, hundreds were arrested, and extremist cells were dismantled. These measures forced radical groups into hiding and sharply reduced their ability to operate.

3.3 The Interim Government Shift (Post–August 2024)
When the AL was removed from power in August 2024, an interim government led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus took over and quickly moved away from the strict counterterrorism approach of the previous government. Despite clear evidence of ongoing extremist propaganda, recruitment, training, and foreign links, the interim leadership publicly claimed there was no terrorism in Bangladesh. They dismissed even those attacks claimed in publications by ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliates—such as Dabiq, Rumiyah, Al-Balagh, and Ansar Media—insisting these were staged events under the AL government to score political points. Many convicted extremists were released on bail without opposition from state prosecutors. Specialized counterterrorism agencies lost their coordination and leadership as experienced officers were removed, and some were even arrested or forced to flee the country to avoid attacks by militants or harassment by government entities. Political space for extremist speech and activity widened, making the environment look alarmingly similar to the early 2000s under BNP–Jamaat rule. The interim government claimed that the absence of attacks in the past year proved there were no active terrorists. This argument ignored—or deliberately concealed—the fact that terrorist attacks are usually the final stage in a cycle that begins with radicalization, moves through extremism, recruitment, training, and preparation. These earlier stages are already underway, often in ways that are widely known and visible.

4. Key Emerging Threats

4.1 Mainstreaming of Extremists
Under the interim government, people and groups with a history of militant activity are being quietly accepted into mainstream Islamic political parties and networks. For example, the radical group Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI) openly promotes extremist ideas and has welcomed convicted terrorists like Mufti Jasim Uddin Rahmani and Maolana Abu Taher. Many members of the pro-Al-Qaeda (AQ) group Ansar-al-Islam (AAI), arrested multiple times since its creation in 2024, are now active again. Former Afghan war fighters who founded HuJI-B and were convicted are also being brought into political parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), and HeI. This is similar to the 2008 attempt to rebrand the banned HuJI-B as the “Islamic Democratic Party” to gain political legitimacy. That effort failed due to strong domestic and international opposition. Today, the political climate is far more open to such integration, giving extremists more legitimacy and influence.

4.2 Links to Foreign Terror Groups
Bangladeshi extremist groups have long maintained foreign links, starting with HuJI-B, JMB, Neo-JMB, AAI, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), which were connected to Al-Qaeda, AQIS, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and ISIS. Now, some groups are actively building stronger ties with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (IS-KP). These ties bring money, weapons, training, and ideological guidance from abroad, and create risks of joint operations that could destabilize Bangladesh as well as neighbouring India and Myanmar. The recent arrest of 36 Bangladeshi nationals in Malaysia for suspected links to ISIS and its networks in Bangladesh shows the seriousness of this threat. The longer these connections remain, the harder they will be to dismantle.

4.3 Militant Training in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT)
The CHT has once again become a hub for militant activity. Extremist groups have set up training camps in this sensitive area, often working with Rohingya armed groups along the Bangladesh–Myanmar border. In 2022–2023, security forces carried out major counterterrorism operations that dismantled the alliance between the Kuki Chin National Liberation Front (KNLF) and the pro-AQIS group Jamaat-ul-Ansar-Fil-Hindal-Sharqiya (JAFHS), arresting top leaders and seizing weapons. However, after August 2024, many of those arrested were released. The CHT’s remote terrain offers cover and escape routes across the border, making it difficult for security forces to act. If these camps are allowed to stay, the area could become a long-term militant base, threatening regional stability.

4.4 Rohingya Terrorist Networks in Bandarban and Cox’s Bazar
Bangladesh hosts over 1.2 million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in 33 camps in Cox’s Bazar and one camp on the remote island of Bhashan Char in Noakhali. Within these camps, two militant groups—the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)—are active again. Earlier, heavy security operations had forced them into deep forest areas and sharply limited their movements. Now, they have returned to the camps, where they are recruiting young Rohingya, training fighters, and collecting weapons and funds. Much of their funding reportedly comes from Pakistan’s ISI and some NGOs based in Pakistan and Turkey.

4.5 Recruitment of Foreign Fighters
There are increasing reports of young Bangladeshis travelling to the Afghanistan–Pakistan border to fight alongside the TTP against Pakistani forces. This mirrors the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, when returning fighters formed militant groups in Bangladesh. Similarly, in recent years, Bangladeshis have gone to Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, while members of the Bangladeshi diaspora in countries like Canada, the USA, the UK, Australia, and Japan have played important roles in funding and supporting groups such as JMB, Neo-JMB, AAI, and HuT. This new wave of fighters risks creating another generation of battle-hardened extremists who could return as trainers, recruiters, and leaders for future militant operations.

4.6 Online Propaganda and Spread of Extremist Messages
Extremist groups in Bangladesh are increasingly using social media, messaging apps, and online platforms to spread radical ideas, recruit new members, and coordinate activities. Encrypted apps like Telegram, Threema, and Signal are being used alongside mainstream platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter) to reach a wider audience. Pro-ISIS, pro-AQIS, and pro-TTP channels share videos, speeches, magazines, and infographics that glorify attacks, promote extremist ideology, and issue calls for action. Many of these messages are targeted at young people, using religious narratives, political grievances, and global Muslim solidarity themes to build support. Since August 2024, monitoring and takedown efforts by law enforcement have weakened due to reduced coordination and political will, giving extremists more space to operate online. If left unchecked, these online campaigns could significantly speed up the radicalization process, turning virtual followers into real-world operatives.

5. Institutional Weakening

5.1 Breakdown of Coordination
The strong cooperation that once existed between counterterrorism agencies—such as CTTC, ATU, CTIB, NSI, SB, Police Headquarters (PHQ), and Criminal Investigation Department (CID)—has been dismantled. Many skilled intelligence officers have been removed from these units and replaced with inexperienced staff. Human sources (HUMINT) that took years to build have been lost, breaking valuable channels of early warning. Since counterterrorism is no longer a government priority, the new officers are less motivated to gather intelligence or share information. Without a central system for intelligence sharing, each agency works on its own, leading to delays, duplication, and a greater risk of mistakes or leaks. In the past, joint task forces could detect and neutralize threats in days, but now potential plots can remain unnoticed for weeks or even months, giving extremists more time to prepare. This lack of coordination is not only a tactical failure but also a strategic gift to militant networks.

5.2 Targeting of Experienced Officers
Many veteran counterterrorism officers with advanced training have been dismissed, suspended, or charged under false accusations. This includes personnel from PHQ, RAB, CTTC, and CTIB. Some are in prison, others are in hiding, and some have fled the country to avoid arrest and harassment. These officers had valuable knowledge and trusted networks built over decades, including direct links to informants and undercover operatives. Their removal has left major leadership gaps that the inexperienced replacements cannot fill quickly, creating weaknesses that militants can take advantage of. The fear of suffering the same fate now discourages current officers from taking bold actions against high-value targets. As a result, militant groups can operate more openly, knowing the state’s most capable officers are sidelined or silenced.

5.3 Legal and Political Pressure on Security Forces
Ongoing legal cases, including some at the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), along with domestic charges, have lowered morale among security personnel. The government’s public denial of terrorism further complicates its work by creating confusion over whether to act against extremist activity at all. While holding people accountable is important, portraying legitimate past counterterrorism operations as crimes damages the confidence of frontline officers. This fear of legal action makes them hesitant to act decisively, which can encourage militants to test the limits of state response. Officers now weigh the personal risks of action against their duty to protect the public, and too often, inaction wins. In this environment, extremists are emboldened to plan, recruit, and train with less fear of state disruption.

5.4 Loss of Operational Capability
Many counterterrorism units have been reduced to little more than symbolic bodies. They lack resources, proper training for newly appointed staff, and clear guidance from top leaders. Without strong leadership or political support, these units now focus more on routine police work instead of specialized anti-terrorism missions. The absence of operational drills, scenario planning, and intelligence-led raids has further weakened readiness. Over time, this loss of capability reduces the state’s ability to deter or respond to militant threats. If this trend continues, even a small coordinated attack could overwhelm current counterterrorism capacity, sending a dangerous signal to both domestic and foreign militant groups.

6. Security Risks from Looted Arms and Escaped Inmates

6.1 Missing Firearms and Ammunition
During the violent unrest of 2024, 1,419 firearms and over 263,000 rounds of ammunition were stolen from police stations and prisons. These weapons have still not been recovered and could easily end up in the hands of militants or dangerous criminals. If used in planned attacks, such firepower could cause large-scale casualties and overwhelm security forces. The weapons could also be sold or traded on the black market, spreading them across multiple extremist or criminal networks. This not only makes recovery harder but also increases the risk of cross-border trafficking. The longer these weapons stay in circulation, the more likely they will be used in organized attacks on security forces, political leaders, or public gatherings.

6.2 Mass Prison Escapes
During the same unrest, 2,200 prisoners escaped from custody. While many have been caught, about 700 are still missing—including 70 high-risk militants and notorious criminals. These fugitives are not ordinary offenders; many have experience in planning or carrying out violent operations. Once free, they can reconnect with extremist groups or criminal syndicates that value their skills and contacts. Some may even take leadership roles in planning new attacks, using their knowledge of law enforcement tactics to avoid capture. Their freedom keeps alive the possibility of renewed violence at short notice. Each day they remain at large increases the likelihood that they will regroup, rearm, and rebuild their operational networks.

6.3 Heightened Threat Potential
The mix of missing weapons and escaped militants is a dangerous combination. Together, they create perfect conditions for both small-scale and large-scale violent incidents. A single coordinated plan could lead to mass casualties or targeted assassinations. This situation also creates a psychological impact, making the public feel unsafe and damaging trust in state security. Criminal groups may become more confident, knowing the state has not recovered either the weapons or the high-risk fugitives. Without urgent action to track down both the arms and the escapees, national security could quickly deteriorate and destabilize entire regions. If left unchecked, this convergence of threats could embolden extremist elements to operate more openly and expand their influence.

7. Strategic Implications

7.1 Domestic Impact
Allowing extremists to gain legitimacy is a serious threat to Bangladesh’s secular traditions. If these groups grow stronger, they can influence laws, policies, and institutions to reflect their radical beliefs. This will push moderate voices out of politics and make it harder to have open and balanced discussions in the country. Over time, the national conversation could become more aggressive and intolerant toward diversity. Such changes would not only divide society but could also create more tension between different religious and cultural groups. If this trend continues, the very character of the Bangladeshi state could change from being inclusive and pluralistic to being dominated by one narrow ideology. This transformation would also make it much harder to reverse extremist influence once it becomes embedded in state structures.

7.2 Regional Consequences
If Bangladesh starts moving toward a theocratic style of governance, the effects will not stop at its borders. Extremist networks in the region will feel encouraged, and counterterrorism cooperation between South Asian countries could break down. This could lead to more cross-border militant activity, with fighters, weapons, and propaganda moving freely across countries. Neighbouring nations like India and Myanmar may face new waves of infiltration and radical influence. Such instability could trigger border tensions, mistrust, and even military build-ups. The resulting insecurity would harm trade, people-to-people ties, and the overall stability of South Asia. In the worst case, the region could see a cycle of retaliatory actions and escalating conflict.

7.3 International Concerns
Many Western countries are already worried that Bangladesh is becoming a safe place for extremist activities. If this continues, it could damage Bangladesh’s global reputation and make other nations hesitant to engage economically or politically. Foreign investors may pull back, fearing instability, while governments might issue stricter travel warnings. These moves could slow down tourism, foreign aid, and economic growth. The country might also face more pressure in international forums, losing influence in trade and security negotiations. Over time, this could isolate Bangladesh on the world stage and weaken its ability to shape its own future in global affairs. This isolation could also make the country more dependent on a narrow set of allies, limiting its strategic options.

8. Threat Forecast and Scenarios

8.1 Best-Case Scenario
With quick and well-planned action, the government corrects earlier mistakes, brings back experienced counterterrorism officers, and restores cooperation between security agencies. This helps stop extremist groups from growing stronger, disrupts their recruitment efforts, and weakens their networks before they can fully recover. Attacks may still happen, but they remain rare, small in scale, and are quickly stopped. International partners begin to trust Bangladesh’s counterterrorism efforts again, which leads to better security cooperation and more economic opportunities. This scenario would also rebuild public confidence in state institutions and reduce fear among communities.

8.2 Most Likely Scenario
If no strong policy changes are made, extremist groups will continue to slowly grow inside political, social, and state systems. They will spread their ideology, recruit members, and build links with foreign groups without triggering major violence in the short term. From time to time, they may carry out small but symbolic attacks to show they are still active, while focusing mainly on strengthening their long-term position. Over the years, extremist ideas could become part of normal political discussion, making it much harder for any government to remove them without paying a high political price. This slow but steady rise could quietly change the country’s political culture before many even realize it.

8.3 Worst-Case Scenario
Militant groups fully join mainstream politics and gain legal recognition while keeping their secret operational networks. Under political protection, they expand training, recruitment, and cooperation with foreign extremist organizations, leading to a major increase in violence. The instability could spread across borders, especially into India and Myanmar, forcing those countries to increase their military presence along the border. A large, deadly attack on civilians, foreign nationals, or critical infrastructure could occur, forcing the government to respond in panic rather than with careful planning. In this scenario, both national security and Bangladesh’s global reputation could suffer lasting damage.

9. Policy and Strategic Recommendations

9.1 Tactical Actions

9.1.1 Reinstate Experienced Counterterrorism Officers
Experienced officers from CTTC, ATU, DGFI, NSI, and SB should be reinstated and allowed to operate without political pressure. Years of expertise, deep knowledge of militant networks, and trusted contacts inside and outside the country are held by these officers. Advanced international training has been received by many, which can be used to restore strong intelligence-sharing with global partners. Their return would signal that expertise is valued again, boosting morale across the security sector. Past intelligence collected by these officers would be preserved and used to guide current operations. Operational readiness would be strengthened immediately, and public confidence in the country’s counterterrorism capacity would be restored.

9.1.2 Rebuild Inter-Agency Coordination
The joint counterterrorism coordination system dismantled under the interim government should be reactivated, with secure channels for sharing intelligence to prevent leaks. A central command cell should be created to coordinate real-time operations across all agencies. Through this, wasted effort would be reduced, precision improved, and security gaps closed. Faster and more united responses to emerging threats would be enabled. Resources could be pooled for high-risk operations, increasing efficiency. Accountability would also be improved, as no agency would be able to withhold critical intelligence without oversight.

9.1.3 Recover Looted Arms and Recapture High-Risk Fugitives
Targeted operations should be launched by specialized teams to recover the 1,419 missing firearms, over 263,000 rounds of ammunition, and capture the 70 high-risk fugitives still at large. If these assets remain in circulation, militants and criminals would retain the means to carry out serious attacks. A sustained recovery plan would disrupt attack plots before they develop. Control over law and order would be visibly reasserted by the state. Public safety would improve as each weapon is recovered and each fugitive is caught. Valuable intelligence about wider militant networks would also be gained from captured fugitives.

9.1.4 Suspend Bail for Convicted Militants
Bail approvals for individuals convicted of terrorism or linked to banned groups should be temporarily suspended until full security reviews are completed. The suspension should be applied legally and transparently to prevent allegations of political targeting. By keeping these individuals in custody, the risk of their reconnecting with militant networks or recruiting new members would be reduced. Opportunities for planning attacks while free would be eliminated. Public confidence would be strengthened as it becomes clear that national security is prioritized over political considerations. Time would also be gained for dismantling their wider support systems.

9.2 Operational Initiatives

9.2.1 Legal and Judicial Reforms
Anti-terrorism laws should be amended so that political pressure cannot affect militant prosecutions. Witness protection programs should be strengthened to ensure safety for those testifying in terrorism cases. Special terrorism courts should be established to process dangerous cases quickly but fairly. This would prevent extremists from escaping justice through loopholes or political interference. Judges and prosecutors would be enabled to perform their duties without fear or bias. Public trust in the justice system would grow, making it harder for militants to operate openly.

9.2.2 Counter-Narrative and De-Radicalization Programs
Community-based programs should be expanded to reach young people before extremist influence takes hold. Respected religious leaders, teachers, community elders, and survivors of terrorism should be engaged to counter extremist propaganda. These programs should be delivered in schools, mosques, and online platforms where radical messages often spread unchecked. Alternative viewpoints would be offered, weakening the appeal of extremist ideologies. Skills, education, and opportunities would be provided to make militancy less attractive. Partnerships with NGOs, media, and social media platforms could further amplify positive narratives and reduce extremist influence over time.

9.2.3 Secure Border Regions and High-Risk Areas
Specialized counterterrorism units should be deployed to the Chittagong Hill Tracts and other high-risk border areas to close militant training camps. Links between local extremists and Rohingya militant groups should be dismantled. Socio-economic development programs should be launched to give vulnerable communities alternatives to militancy. Intelligence-led patrols should target smuggling routes, recruitment hubs, and propaganda channels. Coordination with neighbouring countries should be enhanced to block cross-border militant activities. Over time, increased stability and prosperity in these areas would reduce the chances of them becoming militant safe havens.

9.3 Strategic Posture

9.3.1 Institutional Resilience Building
Permanent counterterrorism agencies should be created with legal protection from political interference, along with their own budgets, staffing, and decision-making authority. These mandates should be enshrined in law to ensure they cannot be weakened by changes in government. This would guarantee continuous counterterrorism work regardless of political shifts. Skilled officers could be trained and retained, preventing the loss of expertise. Quick, independent responses to threats would be enabled without political delay. International and public trust in Bangladesh’s counterterrorism commitment would be strengthened.

9.3.2 International Cooperation and Intelligence Partnerships
Closer work should be undertaken with regional partners such as India, Myanmar, and BIMSTEC, and global partners such as the U.S., EU, and INTERPOL. Intelligence should be shared on militant movements, funding channels, and training activities to disrupt threats before they spread. Joint exercises and officer exchange programs should be conducted regularly to build trust and improve cooperation. Counterterrorism operations would become faster, more accurate, and more coordinated. Extremists would find it harder to hide or cross borders undetected. Over time, global support systems for militancy could be significantly weakened.

9.3.3 Safeguarding Counterterrorism from Political Shifts
Counterterrorism policy should be made part of a national security plan that remains in effect regardless of political leadership. Parliamentary committees with cross-party members should be created to oversee counterterrorism work and maintain continuity. This would prevent policy reversals or neglect due to political changes. Threat responses would remain consistent over time, reassuring both the public and international allies. Extremists would receive a clear message that political divisions will not weaken the fight against them. Such depoliticization would make Bangladesh’s counterterrorism approach stronger and more stable in the long run.

10. Conclusion

Over the past year, militant groups in Bangladesh have focused less on launching immediate attacks and more on quietly rebuilding their strength. This “consolidation phase” allows them to expand their recruitment networks, strengthen logistics, and secure funding—often without attracting much attention from the authorities. The longer they are allowed to grow in this way, the harder it will be to disrupt them in the future. One of the most concerning trends is how closely the government’s public statements now match the narratives used by extremist groups. By downplaying the threat of terrorism or echoing language that militants themselves use, state officials risk giving these groups a sense of legitimacy. This may reduce short-term violence, but it carries a much higher long-term risk—because it normalizes extremist ideas in politics and society. Over time, this can make extremist thinking seem like a reasonable part of public debate, further undermining secular and democratic values.

If no serious action is taken now, the next elected government will inherit a far more dangerous situation. Extremist networks could become deeply embedded in political parties, community organizations, and even parts of the security sector. Reversing that kind of influence will take years, cost significant resources, and require strong political will. To avoid this outcome, Bangladesh must act immediately. That means restoring experienced counterterrorism officers, rebuilding cooperation between agencies, shutting down militant training and recruitment, and countering extremist propaganda both online and offline. It also means passing laws and building institutions that protect counterterrorism policy from political changes. The window for effective action is closing. Every month of inaction strengthens extremist networks, making future solutions more difficult and more costly. A united, non-political, and long-term approach is essential if Bangladesh is to protect its security, stability, and inclusive identity.

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The Author is a Senior Journalist